Algorithmic Multidimensional Mechanism Design

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Event Speaker: 

Costis Daskalakis, CSAIL, MIT

Event Location: 

32-124

Card Description: 

In his seminal paper, Myerson [1981] provides a revenue-optimal auction for a seller who is looking to sell a single item to multiple bidders. Extending this auction to simultaneously selling multiple heterogeneous items has been one of the central problems in Mathematical Economics. We provide such an extension that is also computationally efficient.

Event Date/Time: 

Tuesday, September 11, 2012 - 4:15pm

Research Area: 

Algorithmic Multidimensional Mechanism Design

Speaker: Costis Daskalakis, CSAIL, MIT
Date: Tuesday, September 11 2012
Time: 4:15PM to 5:15PM
Refreshments: 3:45PM
Location: 32-124
Host: Dana Moshkovitz, CSAIL, MIT
Contact: Be Blackburn, 3-6098, imbe@mit.edu

Relevant URL: http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/comp-sci-econ-0625.html

In his seminal paper, Myerson [1981] provides a revenue-optimal auction for a seller who is looking to sell a single item to multiple bidders. Extending this auction to simultaneously selling multiple heterogeneous items has been one of the central problems in Mathematical Economics. We provide such an extension that is also computationally efficient. 

Joint work with Yang Cai, Matt Weinberg

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