Event Speaker:
Costis Daskalakis, CSAIL, MIT
Event Location:
32-124
Card Description:
In his seminal paper, Myerson [1981] provides a revenue-optimal auction for a seller who is looking to sell a single item to multiple bidders. Extending this auction to simultaneously selling multiple heterogeneous items has been one of the central problems in Mathematical Economics. We provide such an extension that is also computationally efficient.
Event Date/Time:
Tuesday, September 11, 2012 - 4:15pm
Research Area:
Algorithmic Multidimensional Mechanism Design
Speaker: Costis Daskalakis, CSAIL, MIT
Date: Tuesday, September 11 2012
Time: 4:15PM to 5:15PM
Refreshments: 3:45PM
Location: 32-124
Host: Dana Moshkovitz, CSAIL, MIT
Contact: Be Blackburn, 3-6098, imbe@mit.edu
Relevant URL: http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/comp-sci-econ-0625.html
In his seminal paper, Myerson [1981] provides a revenue-optimal auction for a seller who is looking to sell a single item to multiple bidders. Extending this auction to simultaneously selling multiple heterogeneous items has been one of the central problems in Mathematical Economics. We provide such an extension that is also computationally efficient.
Joint work with Yang Cai, Matt Weinberg
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